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. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginicl 
AT RICHMOND 
CASKEY BAKING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
Appellant, · 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
Appellee. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR FROM THE CORPORA- 1 
TION COURT OF THE CITY OF WINCHESTER. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Vir_ginia: -
I. KIND OF SUIT. 
This is a criminal action for violation of section 192b of the Tax 
Code, originating by the Police Justice of the City of Winchester, 
upon whose warrant petitioner was found guilty. This warrant 
was issued on September 9th, 1938, upon the complaint of C. P. 
McVicar, Commissioner of Revenue of the City of Winchester, 
and charged petitioner with selling or offering for sale, goods, wares 
and merchandise to a licensed retail merchant without having ob-
tained the license required by the aforesaid section of the Tax Code. 
Upon appeal, petitioner was found guilty by the Corporation Court 
of the City of Winchester, on the ...... day of ........ , 1940, 
and fined ........ dollars and costs. The sentence was suspended 
for a period of sixty days so that petition for a writ of error might 
be made here. 
A transcript of the record, including the opinion of the Judge 
/' 
,'(/,' 
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of the Corporation Court, who tried the case without a jury, as 
determined and settled by that Court, is hereby exhibited, from 
which it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeals has juris~ 
diction. 
2* *Your petitioner is advised and represents to the Court 
that the jndgment and order of the Corporation Court of the 
City of vVinchester is erroneous, and that your petitioner is ag-
grieved thereby in the following particulars : 
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. Section 192b of the Tax Code of Virginia, as amended by 
the Acts of 1938, chapter 305, as applied to your petitioner, is un-
constitutional and void, in that 
(a) It discriminates against your petitioner. 
(b) It denies to your petitioner equal protection of the laws of 
Virginia. 
( c) , It places an improper burden on interstate commerce. 
2. By enacting the statute, having reference to section 73 of 
the Tax Code, the General Assembly usurped the powers of Con-
gress under Art. 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, which 
provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce 
between the States. · 
III. STATEMENT OF. FACTS. · 
There is a stipulation of facts in the record. No evidence was 
taken before the Police Judge. In the Corporation Court, instead of 
taking evidence, there was a stipulation as to the facts, without 
waiving the right of either party to object on the ground of im-
materiality. 
The condensed facts are as follows : 
The Caskey Baking Company, Incorporated, a West Virginia 
corporati.on, domiciled in the City of Martinsburg, in that State, 
and domesticated in Virginia, was and is engaged in making 
3* and selli11g bread to retail dealers in the territory *tributary 
to Martinsburg. This company has paid its annual registra-
tion fees and the State income tax upon its net profits allocable to its 
Virginia business. 
After the manufacture of the bread by petitioner, it was 
brought to the State of Virginia by motor vehicles and sold from 
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place to place from these trucks to licensed retail merchants. These 
trucks operated over regular routes at regular intervals. The trucks 
belong to petitioner and were operated by employees, who were 
paid a fixed salary and \\_'ho had no interest in the merchandise nor 
in the proceeds from such sales. Manifestly, as it was agreed, the 
bread sold was not injurious to the health nor damaging to the 
morals of the citizens of Virginia. 
The petitioner here had no place of business in Virginia; had no 
property permanently located in Virginia; was not a manufacturer 
taxable on capital in Virginia; was not a distributor of manufac-
tured products in Virginia on its purchases ; and was not a licensed 
wholesale dealer. 
The petitioner, at the time of the service of the warrant, towit, 
September 9th, 1938, had not secured the license prescribed by 
section 192-b of the Tax Code, and on that day sold and delivered 
bread from its truck in \Vinchester to Mr. J. E. Keffer, a licensed 
retail merchant, · the bread so sold and delivered being manufac-
tured by petitioner in Martinsburg, West Virginia, and brought to 
Winchester, Virginia, in the truck from which it was taken to be 
sold and delivered. 
IV. QUESTIONS INVOLVED HERE. 
The Corporation Court of the City of Winchester upon the war-
rant, issued upon the complaint of C. P. McVicar, found 
the defendant below, petitioner here, guilty and fined 
4* *petitioner,. as set out in the record. Judge Williams filed a 
written opinion which he made part of the record. 
The questions involved here are: 
1. Is section 192-b of the Tax Code of Virginia, as amended by 
Acts of 1938, chapter 305, as applied to your petitioner, unconsti-
tutional and void, because-
(a) It discriminates against your petitioner? 
(b) It denies to your petitioner equal protection of the laws of 
Virginia? 
( c) It places an improper burden on interstate commerce? 
2. Did the General Assembly, by enacting section 192-b of the 
Tax Code, having reference to section 73 of the Tax Code, usurp 
the power.s of Congress under article 1, section ·8, clause 3 of the 
Constitution, which provides that Con,gress shall have the power to 
regulate commerce between the St~tes? 
4. 
5* 
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· *POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. 
The Tax Imposed Is A Revenue Measure. 
A license tax imposed for the unconditional right of peddling 
is a revenue tax. · 
.Phoebus v. Manhattan Social Club, 105 Va. 144, 52 S. E. 839. 
Discrimination, Unequal Protection of the Laws. 
14th Amendment, Fed·eral Constitution. Sec. 201 Tax Code of 
Virginia. 
Classification of objeds for taxation is permissible but the classi-
fication must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation 
so that all persons similarly situated shall be treasted alike. 
Norfolk v. Griffin Bros., 120 Va. 534, 91 S. E.· 640; 
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. Sd. 299; 
State Bd. Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 
75 L. Ed. 1248; 
Smith v. Farr (Colo.), 104 Pac. 401. 
Regard must be had i:o the particular subject of action. 
Smith v. Cahoon, 203 U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582, 75 L. Ed. 1264: 
Mere difference is not enough, discriminations cannot staqd if. 
they offend the plain standards of a common sense. 
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., v. Harrison, 301 
'U. S. 459, 75 Sup. Ct. 838, 81 L. Ed. 1223. 
If the condition prece:dent of the statute cannot be satisfied by a 
non-resident manufacturer without the imposition of a burden which 
the resident escapes, there is a real discrimination and an offense 
against the Fourteenth Amendment, if both corporations are 
6* within the State. Moreover it is a purden *on interstate. 
commerce. 
Bethlehem Motors C 'Jrp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. Ct. 
571, 67 L. Ed. 1029. 
After being domesticated in Virginia, the appellant is pttt on a 
level with domestic corporations of the same kind, stands equal with 
them, and any tax laws made to apply after it has been so received 
into the State are to be regarded as laws enacted for the purpose of 
raising revenue for the State and must conform to the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr~ 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179, 
71 L. Ed. 372. 
H there be an injurious discrimination against goods because 
of their source, the act is unconstitutional. 
Conimonwealth v. M'yer, 92 Va. 809, 23 S. E. 915; 
Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, supra. 
Interstate Commerce. 
Art. l, sec. 8, cl. 3, Federal Constitution. 
A license tax on the right to sell the goods is a tax ·On the goods. 
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829, 38 L. 
Ed. 719.' 
Likewise a tax on the business itself. 
Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 
384, 55 Sup. Ct. 477, 79 L. Ed. 934. 
A tax on the right to carry on business at all is a direct burden on 
interstate commerce. 
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Commonwealth of Penna., 141 U. S. 
18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876, 35 L. Ed. 613. 
The appellant's method of doung business in interstate comm~rce. 
Wagner v. Cmington, 251 U. S. 95, 95 Sup. Ct. 104, 64 L. 
Ed. 157; 
Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U. S. 353, 
34 Sup. Ct. 826, 58 L. Ed. 1337; 
Commonwealth v. Myer, supra; 
Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, supra. 
7* *License tax statutes are construed liberally in favor of 
the citizen against the government. 
Watts v. Comm., 106 Va. 851, 56 S. E. 223; 
Brown v. Comm., 98 Va. 336, 36 S. E. 485. 
What Is Capital and Where Ta.i·able? 
Sec. 73, Tax Code of Virginia . 
. For the purpose of taxation, intangible property acquires a situs 
at the domicile of the creditor. 
Virginia v. Imperial Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15, 55 S. Ct. 12, 79 
L. Ed. 171; 
6 Supreme Court.of Appeals of Virginia 
Smith v. Aja:x Pine Line Co., 87 F (2nd) 567, cert. den. 300 
U. S. 677, 57 S. Ct. 670, 81 L. Ed. 882; 
Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 
L. Ed. 1143. 
First Bank Stocli Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234, 57 S. Ct. 
677, 81 L. Ed. 1061; 
Curry v. M cCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 83 L. Ed. 1339. 
The Exemption Granted Other Peddlers As A Comparison. 
Sec. 192 of the Tax Code e~empts peddlers of milk, butter, eggs 
and family supplies of a. perishable nature, if grown or produced by 
them. If not grown or produced by them a license tax of $50.00 
is demanded. It also exempts seafood peddlers entirely unless they 
buy from the person catching or taking the same, when a license tax 
of $25.00 is demanded. Seafood peddlers are exempt from sec. 
192 b. 
There is no distinction between the carriage of one food-stuff 
and carriage of another. 
8* 
Smith v. Cahoon, sut,1ra. 
Bread is an article of food sold for immediate consumption. 
Sinclair v. Hatliawa31, 57 Mich. 60, 23 N. W. 459. 
*ARGUMENT. 
The fee demanded of the defendant by the Commonwealth under 
section 192-b of the Tax Code, is nothing more or less than a license 
tax imposed for the unconditional right of peddling. It is not a tax 
on property, personal or real, nor a sales tax. It is purely a revenue 
measure. 
'. Phoebus v. Manhattcm Social Club, 105 Va. 144, 55 S. E. 839. 
I. 
Legislation may be ad justed to differences in things and situa-
tions, but it is limited to the extent that the 14th Aniendnient of the 
Federal Constitution demands that it make no unreasonable or arbi-
trary classification or discrimination, which amendment requires 
the same methods to be applied to all the constituents of the class 
,mbject.ed to the taxation and equa./ and uniform operation upon all 
persons in similar circimistances . 
. Under this head it will be noted that Section 192-b exempts from 
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its provisions, a distributor 01: vendor of motor vehicle fuels and 
petroleum products, tobacco, seafood, and a manufacturer taxable 
on capital by Virginia, or a distributor of manufactured goods pay-
ing a State License on his purchases. 
8* And under Section 201 of the Tax Code it will be noted 
that a person can retail, and therefore peddle, tobacco by 
paying an annual State license tax of Five Dollars ( $5.00). Section 
192-b provides for a license tax of no less than One H_undred 
Dollars ($100.00) for each vehicle used 1n the peddler's business. 
It, therefore, appears from those· considerations that the app.ellant 
occupies a position under 192-b, which is by no means on an equality 
with the persons exempted thereby. The exempted parties have an 
absolute right to peddle their products without paying the tax under 
192-b. True, some of those exempted ·are paying taxes in another 
capacity, but those taxes are not for the privilege of peddling. They 
are for the rights and benefits which accrue to them as residents of 
Virginia. For that matter the applicant is likewise paying such taxes 
in West Virginia and has been domesticated in Virginia to carry 
on its business of selling bakery products. 
The only difference between the appellant and a manufacturer 
resident in Virginia is this: the appellant manufactures in another 
state, and sells in Virginia in exactly the same manner as the resi-
dent bakers. Both the resident manufacturer and the appellant pay 
income taxes on their Virginia business. The resident pays a tax 
on his capital, the defendant does not, and the latter has paid a tax 
for the privilege to do business as a corporation in Virginia. 
Regardless of the tax structure of Virginia and the economic 
forces moving to lay taxes in order to equalize the burden, a tax 
on capital cannot be used as an excuse to exempt a person in the 
same class (peddlers) with others, from paying for the privilege to 
do that which for others in the same class a tax is imposed. 
10* The summation of that situation is *that both have a privi-
lege for the exercise of which one must pay, the other not. 
The privilege has always been present, and the statute recognizes it. 
A more practical application of the unlawful exemptions in the 
statute is disclosed, however, by a consideration of the exempted 
persons. A peddler of sea food can peddle a foodstuff withol!t pay-
ing the tax. Is there any real distinction between a .peddler of sea 
.food, and a peddler of bakery products? Each is selling nothing 
more than a foodstuff. Should not the sea food peddler share his 
burden of taxation if that be the purpose of the statute? Obviously 
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there is no more reason to tax a peddler of one food and exempt a 
peddler of another. 
Likewise a peddler of tobacco. He can carry on his vocation 
after· the payment of Five Dollars ($5.00) license tax. There could 
not be any relation between peddlers of tobacco, sea food and bakery 
products, so different so far as revenues are concerned, that the 
discrimination could run the range of license taxes from zero to 
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00). 
Admitted is it that for the purpose of taxation a State may clas-
sify objects of the tax. But the tlassification so made must be reas-
onable and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly situated or circumstanced shall be treated alike. Norfolk 
v. Griffin Bros. 120 Va. 534, 91 S. E. 640. Colgate v. Harvey 296 
U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct 2~2, 80 L. Ed. 299. State Ed.Tax Comrs. 
v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. Ed. 1248. Regard 
must be had to the particula~ subject of action. Smith v. Cahoon 
203 U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582, "75 L. Ed. 1264. Mere difference 
.is not enough, discriminations cannot stand if they offend the plain 
standards of common sense. Hartford Stearn Boiler Inspection 
and Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 75 Sup. Ct. 838, 81 L. 
Ed. 1223. 
11 * *Realizing that the object of Section 192-b is to provide 
revenue, and recognizing the mandates of the above citations, 
no substantial difference between a peddler of ,one foodstuff and th.e 
peddler of another can be found. How could the vendor of one food 
be different from another? Each peddler is similarly situated; the 
plain standards of common sense are offended. Smith v. Cahoo.n, 
supra, is an apt illustr11tion of how true this is. 
II. 
Regardless of the above discrimination, section 192-b has a fur-
ther effect, wherein it exempts a manufacturer taxable on capital 
by Virginia. To escape the tax the foreign manufacturer must set 
up a factory in Virginia or become a wholesaler or distributor of 
manufactured goods. The only argument against this charge of 
inequality in this regard is that it applies alike to non-resident as 
well as resident_ manufacturers, the inference being, as suggested 
by Armour v. Virginia., 118 Va. 242, 87 S. E. 610, 246 U.S. 1, 38 
Sup. Ct. 267, 62 L. Ed. 547, that its condition can be as easily met 
by the non-resident as by the resident manufacturer, and therefore· 
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it discriminates against neither. But there is no sound basis jn this. 
,!\n identical situatio11 was considered in Bethlehem Motors Corp 
v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. Ct. 571, 65 L. Ed. 1029. Said 
Justice McKenna : 
"To this we cannot assent. The condition can be sat-
isfied by a resident manufacturer, his factory and its· 
produtcs in the first instance being within the· State, 
it cannot be satisfied. by a non-resident manufacturer, 
his factory necessarily being in another state, some of its 
products in the first instance being within the State, 
Therefore, there is a real . discrimination, and an offense 
against the 14th Amendment, if we assume that the c~r-
pora tions are within the state." 
I 
Since the appellant is a corporation domesticated in Virginia, it 
meets the mandate of that case decided after Armour v. Virginia, 
supra, which is not applicable to the case at bar, and if it 
12* were, *has been, to that extent, impliedly overruled. 
Moreover, the appellant being a domesticated corporation 
in Virginia, has the further protection .of Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Carr, 272 U. S. 494, 57 Sup. Ct. 179, 71 L. Ed. 372, which deter-
mined that after its admission, a foreign corporation is put on a 
level with domestic cor.porations of the same kind, stands equal 
with them, and any tax laws made to apply after it has been so 
received into the state are to be considered laws enacted for the 
purpose of raising revenue for the state and must conform to the 
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. 
Therefore, because the appellant, in order to escape the tax, 
must change its method, pf doing business, and become a whole-
saler, or distributor, or resident manufacturer, taxable on capital, 
it has been discriminated against. Especially so when sea food 
peddlers, tobacco peddlers, and manufacturers taxable on capital 
by Yirginia, need not change their method of selling, and the 
manufacturer taxable on capital by Virginia need not become a 
wholesaler or distributor. This answers the opinion of the lower 
court that the defendant could escape the· tax by coming into Vir-
ginia and setting up its business to coincide with the exemptions. 
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III. 
If ther~ be an injurioits discrimination against goods because of 
their soitrce, the act is unconstitutional. 
In Commonwealth v. Myer, 92 Va. 809, 23 S. E. 915, a statute, 
identical with section 192-b was under consideration. And the cor-
poration in that case occupied the same extrastate position as the 
Caskey· Baking Company, except that it had not been domesticated 
in Virginia. It sold its products as a peddler, through a non-resi-
deJ.Jt agent, who was the defendant. For failure to pay a 
13* peddlers license tax the agent was found guilty. The statute 
exempted a manufacturer taxable on capital by Virginia. 
Said Judge Keith : 
"A citizen of Virginia who had manufactured the iden .. 
tical article could have hawked or peddled it from place to 
place within the limits of the Commonwealth without 
incurring the penalties denounced by Section 32. If that 
. be so, then the statute ui:ider. consideration does injuri-
. ously discriminate against the products of other states 
and the rights of other citizens, and is an attempt to fetter 
commerce among the states, and does deprive the citizen 
of another state of the privileges and immunities pos-
sessed by citizens of this state, and is an infringement of 
the provisions of the constitution and therefore void." 
How applicable to the case at bar~ It cannot be imagined that 
any manufacturer in Virginia corporate or natural, even though 
manufacturing without the state, is not taxable on caJ?ital by Vir-
ginia. Sec. 73 of the Tax Code is too inclusive to argue otherwise. 
It.is apparent then, under Commonwealth v. Jvlyer, supra, and cases 
there cited, that not only the appellant's goods are being discrimi-
nated against because it has not seen fit to be forced into Virginia 
to manufacture, a result condemned by Bethlehem 1.l!J otors C '?· v. 
Flynt, supra, but that the appellant itself is being injured. 
Tax.able on Capital. 
. When it is realized that the situs of the ownership of intangible 
capital, as defined by said sec. 73, is the domicile of the creditor or 
t!'te owner, the discrimination against a non-resident or goods of 
non-resident origin, becomes more apparent. Virginia v. Imperial 
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Coal. Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15, 55 Sup. Ct. 12, 79 L. Ed. 171, in in-
terpreting sec. 73, held that money on hand and bills of account re-
ceivable have their situs, for purposes of taxation in Virginia. 
Moreover, as was held also by Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 
Fed. (2nd) 567, cert. den., 300 U. S. 677, 57 Sup. Ct. 670, 81 L. 
Ed. 882; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S.' 193, 56 Sup. Ct. 
773, 80 L. Ed. 1143; First Bank Stock Corporation v. Min-
14* nesota, 301 U. S. 234, 57 Sup. Ct. 677, *81 L. Ed. 1061; 
CurrY. v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 83 L. Ed. 1939, all 
intangibles have their taxation situs at the domicile of the creditor 
or owner. The last named case even holding the same in reference 
to bank deposits. 
Now, how could any resident manufacturer of Virginia escape 
taxation on capital by Virginia? It is impossible, regardless of the 
business the resident might do. Even if manufactured in another 
state, he would still be ~axc1:ble on capital by Virginia. Obviously, 
then, the exemption of sec. 192-b, given to manufacturers, taxable 
on capital by Virginia, is a subterfuge used to veil the real intent of 
the statute. It could have no other purpose. 
The same applies to goods of non-resident origin. If a manufac-
turer of Virginia taxable on capital peddles them he is exempt 
because under sec. 73, it is impossible for him not to be untaxed on 
capital. The exempting provision of the statute is an illegal piece 
of shrewd legislation. Knowing that no non-resident could, at first 
instance qualify, the legislature immediately discriminated against 
goods of foreign origin, protecting local manufacture and 111anu-
facturers. Said Mr. Justice Field, in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S 
275, 23 L. Ed. 347: 
"It is sufficient to hold now that the commercial power 
( of the Federal Government over a commodity) con-
tinues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject 
of discriminating legislation, by reason of its foreign 
character. That power protects it, even after it has en-
tered the State, from any burdens imposed by reason of 
its foreign origin. The Act of Missouri encroaches upon 
this power in this respect and is, therefore, in our judg-
ment, unconstitutional and void." 
From these considerations it must be apparent that the "taxable 
on capital" exemption i? nothing more than a veiled discrimination, 
which when brought to light, discloses the obvious intent of 
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13,ic the· statute to protect local manufacturers. *to the detriment 
of those in the same situation as the appellant. No dis-
crii:nination could be more selective and detrimental in its appli-· 
cation. 
Interstate Commerce. 
The lower court relied strongly on Wagner v. Coi·fog/011, 251 
U.S. 95, 95 Sup. Ct. 104, 64 Ed. 157; Home Machine Co. v.. Gage, 
100 U. S. 676, 25 L. Ed. 754, and Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 
296, 39 L. Ed .. 430, for sustaining the proposition that peddling 
is interstate commerce. These cases simply hold that because the 
tax was uniform on all peddlers, interstate commerce was not bur-
dened. They recognize that the carrying of the goods. over the 
state lines is interstate commerce. Said Mr. Justice Pitney: in 
Wagner v. Covington: "Of course the transportation of plaintiff's 
goods across the state line is of itself interstate commerce." And 
quoting from Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 7 
Sup. Ct. 5'92~ 30 L. Ed. 694, he further said : · · 
"When goods are sent from one state to another for 
sale, or in consequence of a sale, tltey become part of its 
general property, and amenable to its laws; provided tha't , 
no discriniination be made against them as goods from 
another state, and that they be not taxed by reason of 
being brought from another state, but only taxed in the 
usual way." 
It was because of the lack of discrimination tnat the taxes were 
upheld. 
In fact a license tax required for the sale of' goods is a tax on 
. the goods themselves. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 
Sup. Ct. 829, 38 L. Ed. 719. It is a tax on the business. Cooney 
v. Mountain States Relepltone and Telephone Co., 294 U. S. 384, 
55 Sup. Ct. 477, 49 L. Ed. 934. And therefore a tax on interstate 
commerce. Pullman's Palace Car Co. V'. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 
18, l1 Sup. Ct 876, 35 L. Ed. 613; Sault Ste. Marie v. International 
Transit Co., 234 U.- S. 353, 34 Sup. Ct. 826, 581=,. Ed. 1337. 
16* The *Method of sale employed by appellant is interstate 
commerce. Commonwealth of Virginia v. M3,er, supra .. 
When an extrastate manufacturer, to escape taxation for the right 
to sell is forced by the state of sale to come into· the state of sale, 
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or bring assets there for taxation, it is interstate commerce and the 
tax is void. Bethlehem Motors Corp! v. Flynt, supra. 
The Exemption Granted Other Peddlets as a Comparison 
Sec. 192 exempts peddlers of meats, milk, butter, eggs, p'oultry, 
fish, oysters, game, vegetables, fruits or other family supplies of a 
,perishable nature grown or produced by them, and not purchased 
for sale. If not grown or produced by them the license tax for 
peddling is $50.00 for each vehicle used in each county and city. It 
wholly exempts seafood peddlers as does sec. 192-b, unless they 
buy the seafood from the persons who take or catc~ the same, 
in which instance the fee is $25.00 for each vehicle used in the 
peddling. 
As was noted in Smith v. Cahoon, supra, there is no justification 
for a distinction between carrying one foodstuff and carrying 
another. So in the case at bar there is no justification for a distinc-
tion between peddling one food ·and peddling another. What differ-
ence could there be in peddling butter, eggs, etc., and peddling bread? 
The statute emphatically makes one, although it is absolutely obvious 
that bread is a "family supply of a perishable nature." The Court 
well knows it is an article of food that rapidly becomes stale, and is 
sold for immediate consumption. Sinclair v. Hathaway, 57 Mich. 
60, 23 N. ·w. 459. It is the staff of life. 
The comparison, noting particularly that peddlers of seafood are 
qualifiedly exempt from sec. 192 and absolutely from sec. 192 b, and 
peddlers of agricultural products such as butter, eggs, milk, etc., are 
exempt from 192 and 192 b if they grow or produce them and taxed 
lightly as contrasted with app~llant, if they do not, com-
17* pletely annihilates the position that the *appellant is not an 
object of discrimination. 
SUMMARY. 
With the proposition noted that statutes imposing license taxes 
are construed liberally in favor of the citizen against the govern-
ment Watts v. Comm., 106 Va. 851, 56 S. E. 223; Brown v. 
Comm., 98 Va. 336, 36 S. E. 48?, it is urged that section 192 b of 
the Tax,Code of Virginia, is invalid because: 
(a) It violates the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion,· in denying equal protection of ~he laws of Virginia 
\ 
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to the appellant, and unlawfully discriminates against it. 
(b) It violates Art 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3, the commerce clause of the 
said constitution by impo~ing a burden on interstate com-
merce. 
PRAYER. 
.Petitioner prays that a writ of error and supersedeas may be 
granted it, and that the errors of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Winchester, enumerated in the foregoing assignments of 
error may be corrected, the judgment be reversed and annulled and 
the case re_manded for such further proceedings as justice may 
require. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. GRAY \VILLIAMS, 
J. SLOAN KUYKENDALL, 
MARTIN, SEIBERT AND BEALL, 
Attorneys. for Appellant. 
The undersigned certify that on the 23 day of March, 1940, we 
received a copy of the foregoing petition for appeal. 
18* 
ABRAM P. STAPLES, 
W. W. MARTIN, 
JAMES i?. REARDON, 
Attorneys for the Commonwealth. 
*CERTIFICATE. 
I, R. Gray Williams, of vVinchester, Virginia, an attorney prac-
ticing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, hereby certify 
that in my opinion there is error in the judgment of Corporation 
Court, City of Winchester, in favor of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, and against the petitioner herein, as set forth in the foregoing 
· am1ex·ed petition, for which the same should be reviewed by the 
S~preme Court of Appeals. 
R. GRAY WILLIAMS, 
Attorney. 
·STATEMENTS. 
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1. Petitioner adopts this petition as its opening brief. 
2. I, R. Gray Williams, Counsel for petitioner, hereby certify 
that . on the 25th day of March, 1940, a copy of the foregoing 
petition was delivered to Abram P. Staples, W. W. Martin and 
James P. Reardon, counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia in 
the court below. I further certify that the petition will be filed with 
M. B. Watts, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
R. GRAY WILLIAMS. 
Received March 26, 1940. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
April 10, 1940. \i\Trit of error and supersedeas awarded. Bond 
$300.00. M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Winchester, To-Wit: 
To the Chief of Police, or any of his assistants, of said city: 
Whereas, C. P. Mc Vicar, Comm. of Revenue City of Winchester, 
of said city, has this day made complaint and information on oath, 
before me, Donald L. Weems, Police Justice of said City, that 
Caskey Baking Corporation and Correll Brown, on or about the 
9th day of September, 1938, in said city, did unlawfully violate 
se~tion 192-b of the Tax Code of Virginia as amended in Chap. 
305 of the 1938 Acts of Legislature, in that they did sell or offer 
for sale goods, wares and merchandise to one J. E. Keffer without 
having obtained the license required by the aforesaid section of the 
Tax Gode of Virginia. 
These are, therefore, in the name of the Commonwealth ·of Vir-
ginia, to command you forthwith to apprehend and bring before me 
· the body of said Caskey Baking Corp. and Correll Brown to answer 
said complaint and be dealt with according to law. 
Given under my hand this 9th day of September, 1938. 
DONALD L. WEEMS, Police Justice. 
page 2 ~ THE COMMONWEALTH, 
vs. 
CASHEY BAKING CORP. AND CORRELL BROWN. 
Executed this 10th day ·of September, 1938 by arresting the 
within named Correll Brown, and bringing him before D. L. 
Weems, Police Justice. 
EDWIN SMITH, Police Officer. 
page 3 ~ JUDGMENT OF COURT. 
Judgement, this 10th day of September, 1938, that within named 
defendant is guilty upon testimony on_ oath of J. E. Keffer and C. P. 
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McVicar, and it is adjudged that he pay a fine of $50.00 and costs 
of $5.25. 
D. L. WEEMS, Police Justice. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
My judgment above has been appealed from and it is hereby 
certified this 10th day of September, 1938, to the Corporation Court 
of this City for trial.. 
D. L. WEEMS, Police Justice. 
Counsel for defendant vVilliams and Kuykendall. 
page 4 } VIRGINIA : In the Corporation Court of the 
City of Winchester. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
vs. Stipulation of Facts 
CASKEY BAKING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
a corporation. 
Abram P. Staples, W.W. Martin and James P. Reardon, attor-
neys representin'g the Commonwealth · of Virginia, and Clarence 
E. Martin, Clarence E. Martin, Jr., R. Gray Williams and J. Sloan 
Kuykendall, attorneys representing the Caskey Baking Company, 
Incorporated~ a corporation, do hereby agree and .stipulate the fol-
lowing to be the facts upon which this case shall be heard : 
1. On the 9th day of September, 1938, the Caskey Baking 
Company, Incorporated, a corporation chartered under the laws of 
the State of vV est Virginia and domiciled at Martinsburg in said 
State, and also domesticated to do business in the State of Virginia, 
as ·hereinafter more fully appears, was engaged in the business of. 
selling and offering for sale bread and other bakery product~ in the 
State of Virginia to grocers and other retail dealers. The bread 
and other bakery products were sold and delivered at one and the 
same time by defendant's employees from defendant's motor ·he-
hicles, and no previous orders therefor were taken from the cus-
tomers. 
18 Suprenie Court of Appeals of Virginia 
2. The Caskey Baking Company, Incorporated, on and before 
September 9, 1938, was domesticated to do business in the State 
of Virginia under and pursuant to Section 3847 of the Code of 
Virginia, which which it had complied, and it had paid the entrance 
fee for foreign corporations provided in Section 207 of 
page 5 ~ Chapter 15 of rthe Tax Code and had paid the annual 
registration fee prescribed by Section 210 of the Tax Code 
and had fully complied with the statutes of Virginia applicable in 
the premises. 
3. The defendant, on the aforesaid date, was engaged in selling 
in the · manner described in the first numbered paragraph hereof 
bread and other bakery products in the City of Winchester, Virginia, 
and was arrested and prosecuted under and by virtue of a warrant 
issued by Donald L. Weems, Police Justice of the City of Win-
chester, Virginia. This warrant was issued upon a complaint ·made 
by C. P. McVicar, Commissioner of Revenue of the City of Win-
chester, Virginia, charging defendant with the violation of Section 
192-b of the Tax Code of Virginia, as amended by Chapter 305 
of the 1938 Acts of the General Assembly, for this, to-wit: . 
That it has sold, or offered for sale, goods, wares and merchan-
dise to one J. E. Keffer, a licensed retail merchant in Virginia, 
without having obtained the license required by the aforesaid section 
of the Tax Code of Virginia. 
The defendant was found guilty and fined in the sum of $50 and 
costs, from which conviction an appeal was taken, on the 10th day 
of September, .1938, to the Corporation Court of the City of Win-
chester, Virginia. 
4. The goods, wares and merchandise sold and offered for sale 
by defendant were manufactured by defendant in the City of 
Martinsburg, West Virginia, and brought to the State of Vir-
ginia by motor vehicles and sold and offered for sale in the manner 
described in the first numbered paragraphs from place to 
page 6 ~ place in Virginia from said motor vehicles. Defondant 
operated its motor vehicles in Virginia over regular routes' 
and at regular intervals, selling and offering for sale in the manner 
described in the first numbered paragraph hereof its bread and other 
bakery_ products to grocers and other retail dealers in Winchester 
and other places in Virginia, all of whom were regular customers 
of the defendant. 
5. Said motor vehicles are the property of the defendant 
corporation, and were operated by employees of the defendant cor-
poration. These employees were paid a fixed salary. 
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6. The drivers of the vehicles, who actually made the sales and 
delivered the bread and other bakery products, had no interest in 
the merchandise, nor in the proceeds from such sales. 
7. The goods, wares and merchandise, namely, the bread and 
other bakery products, were not injurious to the health nor damag-
ing to the morals of the citizens of the State of Virginia. 
8. The defenadant corporation had no place of business in 
Virginia except it has designated, pursuant to section 3847 of the 
Code of Virginia, the office of R. Gray Williams in Winch~ster, 
Virginia, as its office in this State, at which all claims due residents 
of Virginia may be audited, settled and paid; had no property per-· 
manently located in Virginia; was not a manufacturer taxable on 
capital by Virginia under section· 73 of the Tax Code of Virginia; · 
was not a distributor of manufactured products in Virginia paying 
a State license Tax on its purchases; was not a wholesale dealer 
regularly licensed by Virginia. Defendant has paid no taxes of any· 
kind in Virginia, State or local, including license taxes on its motor 
Vehicles operated in Virginia, except those described in the second 
nurnbered paragraph hereof and a State income tax upon 
page 7 ~ that portion of its net profits, if any, allocable to its 
Virginia business. 
9. Defendant has not secured the license prescribed by section 
192-b of the Tax Code of Virginia and did on September 9, 1938, 
sell and deliver in Winchester, Virginia, to one J. E. Keffer, a 
licensed retail mejchant in Virginia, in the manner described in the 
first numbered paragraph hereof, bread and other bakery products 
manufactured · by defendant in Martinsburg, West Virginia. 
10. The highways in Virginia traveled over by defendant's 
motor vehicles are owned, operated and maintained l1y and at the 
expense of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the State police 
officers patrolling said high,vays are provided and compensated by 
the said Commonwealth. 
· 11. All of the provisions of State statutes and local laws of · 
Virginia and West Virginia relating to the taxation of (a) cor-
porations, and ( b) capital of any trade or business, and ( c) mer-
chants, both wholesale and retail, and ( d) income, and ( e) motor 
vehicles, and (f) property, ate being enforced by the State and 
local tax authoroities of Virginia and Vv est Virginia respectively. 
12. There are a number of other corporations manufacturing 
goods, wares and merchandise, in States other than Virginia, in-· 
eluding corporations manufacturing bread and other bakery prod-
ucts, selling and offering for sale such manufactured goods, wares 
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and merchandise in Virginia in the same manner and under sub-
stantially the same circumstances and facts as are herein described. 
13. This stipulation is agreed to withoutt prejudice 'to the 
right of either party to object to the admissibility of any 
page 8 ~ of the stipulated facts on such grounds as to either party 
m~y appear proper. 
CASKEY BAKERY COMPANY, Incorporated. 
_ By R. Gray Williams, 
Clarence E. Martin, 
Clarence E. Martin, Jr. 
J. Sloan Kuykendall, 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
By Abram P. Staples, 
W. W. Martin, 
James P. Reardon. 
Filed in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court for City of 
·Winchester, Va., January 28, 1939. 
CORINNE BARNETT, Deputy Clerk. 
page 9 ~ In the Corporation Court for the c_ity of 
Winchester, Va. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
v. 
CASKEY BAKING COMP ANY, Incorporated. 
The Caskey Baking Company, Incorporated, a West Virginia 
corporation domesticated in Virginia, was convicted of violating 
section 192-b of the T·ax Code of Virginia for peddling without the 
license required by that statute. An appeal froin the magistrate's 
judgment of guilty was taken to this court and the case has been 
submitted upon a stipulation of facts. Under reservation· in the 
stipulation, objection is made to the relevancy of ·paragraphs ·10, 
· 11, and 12. No objection is seen to the first two of these, but 
the third appears to be irrelevant. 
The defense asserted is that the statute, upon ·which the ,convic-
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tion. rests, is unconstitutional because it contravenes the commerce· 
clause ( A~ticle 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3) a~d the equal protection of' the 
law ,clause (Fourteenth Amendment) of the United States Con-
stitution~ 
The defendant admittedly engaged in peddling bakery products 
in Virginia after ·transporting them from its bakery in West Vir-
ginia. 
Tliis statute imposes "an annual State license tax on every person, 
firm and Corporation ( other than a distributor and/ or vendor of . 
motor vehicle fuels and petroleum products, tobacco, or seafood, 
a producer of agricultural products, or a manufacturer taxable on 
capital by this State, or a distributor of manufactured· goods paying 
a State license tax on his purchases~ who or which shall 
page fO ~ peddle goods, wares or merchandise by selling and de-
Ii vering the same at the same time to licensed dealers or 
retailers at other than a definite place of business operated by the 
seller." It provides that it shall not apply "to wholesale dealers 
regularly licensed by this State, and who shall at the same time 
sell and deliver merchandise to retail merchants." The amount of 
th~ tax imposed is $100.00 for each vehicle used in the peddling. It 
is also provided that this license confers authority to peddle through-
out the State as a state license, but that towns and.cities may impose 
license taxes for peddling within their corporate limits. Sec. 192-b 
The Tax Code of Va. 1938: Acts 1932, p. 376; 1938, page 439. 
This and related sections of The Tax Code show that vendors 
who engage in peddling, such as that covered by this section, are 
thus classified and taxed: 
1. Vendors solely engaged in peddling. These are taxed as 
provided by this section, and may be also required to pay city and 
town taxes. ( Secs. 192-a and 192-b, Tax Code of Va. 1938.) 
2. Manufacturers taxable on capital by the State. These are 
exempt from license tax, state, city, town and county, for peddling 
their manufactured goods, but they are taxed on their capital. ( Secs. 
18:S, 192-b, 73 Tax Code, Va., 1938.) 
3-. Distributors of manufactured goods and wholesale dealers 
licensed by the state. These are exempt from state license tax for 
such peddling ( 192-b, Tax Code) but are taxable on their pur-
chases ( 188 Tax Code) by the state, and are also subject to city and 
town license taxes. ( 188; 192-a, Tax Code.) 
page n ~ 4. Distributors and vendors of motor vehicle fuels 
and petroleum products, tobacco, or seafood, a farm; a 
farmer's co-operative association, a producer of agricultural prod:.. 
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ucts. These are exempt from this Sttae license tax. ( 192-b, 
Tax Code.) . 
· The terms of this statute limit it to domestic commerce-ped-
dling in Virginia; they do not invade the sphere of interstate com-
merce; they do not discriminate as between the origin of the peddler 
nor as to where the peddled wares originate. The defendant, a 
West Virginia corporation, is rquired to pay a tax for peddling 
and so is a Virginia corporation; the tax applies to all peddlers, 
regardless of where they or their goods came from. 
Emphasis should be focused upon the fact that the defendant 
seeks to engage in domestic commerce within the state, and that. it 
attacks a tax imposed upon that commerce which the state has the 
right to regulate and to tax. The defendant, it must be remembered, 
is not affected by this law in its interstate commerce. This statute 
does not attempt to impose a tax, for instance, upon deliveries 
made by clefet~dant in Virginia for merchandise it has sold on orders. 
The defendant wishes to transport its merchandise into the state and 
peddle it there; each of its trucks then becoming a travelling store 
in Virginia. That is the business which this statute taxes. 
It has long since been settled that peddling is domestic, not int~r-
state commerce; and that it may be taxed by the state. Howe 
Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676, 26 L. Ed. 734; Emert. v. 
Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, L. Eel. 4'30; Wagner v. Covington, 251, U. 
S. 9 5, 64 L. Ed. 734. 
page 12 ~ In the case last cited above this statement epitomized 
the decisions on this subject: 
"We have, then, a state tax tipon the business of an itinerant 
vendor of goods as carried on within the state, a tax applicable 
alike to all such dealers, irrespective of where their goods are 
manufactured, and without discrimination against goods manu-
factured in other states. It is settled by repeated decisions of this 
court that a license regulation or tax of this nature, imposed by a 
state with respect to the making of such sales of goods within its 
borders, is not to be qeemed a regulation or direct burden upon 
· interstate commerce, although impartially with respect to ·goods 
manufactured without as well as within the state, and does not 
conflict with the commerce clause." 
In Emert v. Missouri, supra, in which the opinion by Mr. Justice 
Gray reviews this subject, this is said of the peddler: "The only 
business or commerce in which he was engaged was internal and 
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was dealing had become a part of the mass of property wit}:iin the 
state. Both the occupation and the goods, therefore, were subject 
to the taxing power, and to the police power, of the state." 1 
It is contended, however, that the exemption in the statute, 
in favor of manufacturers taxable on capital, has the effect of 
exempting resident manufacturers and their products from this 
taxation ; and that this is discriminatory as to non-residents and 
results in a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Cited, is 
a line of cases holding that state taxation which dis-
page 13 ~ criminates against foreign products or persons is violative 
of the commerce clause. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 
344, 26 L. Ed. 565; Welton v. 1vlissouri, 91 U. S . . 275, 23 L. Ed. 
347; Morrill v. Wisconsin 154 U. S. 626, 14 Sup. Ct. 1206, 23 L. 
Ed. 1009; Minnesota v. Blasuis 290 U. S. 1, 78 L. Ed. 131; Broum 
v. Maryland, 12 Wheat 419, 6 L. Ed. 678; Coninwnwealth v. Myer, 
92 Va. 809, 23 S. E. 915. 
But that line of cases is based upon the holding that the laws in 
question, either in terms or effect, imposed a direct burdon upon 
interstate commerce. Certainly, in terms, this statute does not do 
that; nor, in effect, does it appear to do so. Rather, it se~ms, this 
case is to be ruled by the principals of Arnwur and Co. v. Virginia, 
246 U.S. 1, 62 L. Ed. 547, and same case in 118 Va. 242, 87 S. K 
610; Reyman Bre1.uing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 446, 45 L. Ed. 
269'; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, 43 L. Ed. 323. 
In Armour and Co. v. Virginia, the statute exempted from a 
merchants' license tax, manufacturers taxed on capital by the state, 
who offered for sale at the place of manufacture goods, wares, and 
merchandise manufactured by them. Armour and Company, a cor-
poration of New Jersey and qualified to do business in Virginia, had 
no manufactory in Virginia but did have distributing houses for 
marketing its merchandise. These were required to pay the mer-
chants' license tax. The constitutionality of the taxing statute was 
challenged upon the same grounds asserted in· the case now before 
this court. Armour and Company contended that the exemptiog 
noted discriminated against the foreign manufacturer because, hav-
ing no place of manufacture within the state, it could not have. 
advantage of the exemption enjoyed by the domestic manufacturer. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that here 
page 14 ~ was no such discrimination and that the statute was con-
stitutional. The opinion cited, on this question, the cases 
last above referred to, and distinguished C onimonwealth v. Myer, 
supra., holding it inacplicable. 
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Upop appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, .this 
decision was sustained, and upon the question of discrimination,. the 
opinion, in part, stated that: "The Error of the argument results 
from confounding the direct burden necessarily arising from a 
statute which is unconstitutional becai1se it exercises a power con-
cerning interstate commerce not possessed, or because of the un-
lawful· discriminations which its provisions express or by operation 
necessarily bring about, and the indirect and wholly negligible in-
fluence on interstate commerce, even if in some respects detrimental, 
arising from a statute which there was power to enact, and in 
which there ·was an absence ·of all discrimination, whether express 
or implied, as the result of the necessary operation and effect of its 
provisions. The distinction between the two has been enforced from 
the beginning as vital to the perpetuation of our constitutional 
system. Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the court below, that 
principal as applied in adjudged cases is here directly applicable and 
authoritatively controlling." 
Th,e opinion cited Nerw York v. Roberts and Reyman Breunng 
Co. v. Brester, supra, and then concluded: "In saying this we have 
not overlooked or failed to consider the many cases cited in the 
argument at bar on the theory that they are to the contrary, when 
in fact they all rest upon the conclusion that a direct burden on 
interstate commerce arose from statutes inherently void for want 
of power, or, if within the power possessed, were intrinsicately 
repugnant to the commerce clause because of discriminations against 
interstate commerce which t~ey contained." 
page 15 ~ In further comment upon the assertion that the 
statute discriminated against the foreign manufacturer, 
the opinion stated: "It follows, therefore, that if the asserted dis-
advantage be real, and n'ot imiginary, it would be one not direct, 
because not arising from the operation and effect of the statute, 
but indirect, as a mere consequence of the situation of the persons 
~nd property affected· and of the nondiscriminating exercise by the 
state of power which it had a right to exert without violating the 
constitution, which is indeed but to say that tre disadvantage relied 
upon, if any, is but the indirect result of our dual system of gov-
ernment." · 
The case of N en, Yorlz v. Roberts, su,pra, involved the as~erted 
unconstitutionality, upon the ground of illegal discrimination, be-
tween domestic and foreign corporations, of a tax statute of the 
state of New York which imposed a tax on the amount of capital, 
employed within the state, by corporations doing business therein, 
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and containing an exemption from the tax in favor of corporations 
wholly engaged in manufacturing within the state. The challenge 
to this statute was made by a corporation of the state of Michtgan, 
which had qualified to do business in New York. It manufactured 
its products outside of that state and se~t them into it for safe in 
the original packages at its warehouse there. 
"It is true," said .the court, "Manufacturing or mining cor-
porations wholly engaged in carrying on manufacture or min-
ing ores w.ithin the state of New York are execpted from this 
tax; but such exemption is not restricted to New York but 
includes corporations of other states as well, when wholly engaged 
in manufacturing within the state" -"It is said that the 
page 16 ~ operation of that portion of this taxing law, which ex-
empts from a business tax corporations which are wholly 
wngaged in manufacturing within the state of New York, is to 
encourage manufacturing corporations which seek to do business 
in that state to bring their plants into New York. Such may be the 
tendency of the legislation, but so long ~s the privilege is not re-
stricted to New York corporations, it is not per~eived that thereby 
any ground is afforded to justify the intervention of the Federal 
courts." 
In Re;•mand Bre'l.Ving Co. v. Brister, supra, a tax statute of 
Ohio was contended to be unconstitutional upon the same grounds 
asserted in the case now before this court, because it discriminated 
in favor of manufacturers in Ohio as against those with plants 
located outside that state. There was in the statute an exemption 
from the tax in favor or the manufacturer who sold at the manufac-
tory, and this was asserted tq be discriminatory. New York v. 
Roberts was cited in holding that this contention was not sound and 
that the statute was valid. 
It has been concluded, therefore, that the exemptions, in the 
statute here discussed, are not such discrimination as to render the 
statute violative of the commerce clause. Neither does it seem 
that denial of the equal protection of the law is to be found in the 
exemptions provided for by this statute. These exemptions form 
but a part of a correlated system of tax classification, as before 
stated ; and they must be so considered in testing them. Is there not 
a reasonable basis for placing in separate classes the manufacturer, 
the distributor and wholesaler, and the itinerant vendor 
page 17 ~ or peddler? Is hostile discrimination apparent because the 
manufacturer, who is taxable upon his basic capital, is not 
also taxed by a license tax for sending his products out through 
the state for sale and delivery? Must he be taxed, also, for this 
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incidental operation, notwithstanding he is taxed basically in an-
other form, just because a peddler, who is not taxable as a manu-
facturer, must pay a license tax for peddling? Mu.st a wholesale 
dea\er or distributor, taxable on purchases, be required to p~y an 
atlditional license tax for selling, and delivering this taxed mer-
chandise, in order to conform with the tax required of the peddler, 
who is not taxed on his purchases? 
· It is to be noted that the defendant is neither a manufacturer, a 
wholesale dealer, nor a distributor, in Virginia; and that it there-
fore cannot be taxed as such. But there ·is nothing in the tax laws 
of Virginia to prevent it from becoming one of these, in which 
event it would be entitled to the exemptions applicable because it 
would be taxed in another form. Defendant is subject to the 
peddlers, tax, because it apparently prefers to remain outside these 
classes; remaining outside it would not be taxed at all unless by the 
license tax imposed. 
In the three cases, last above referred to, it was contended, upon 
reasoning like that here applied by clef endant, that the exemptions 
from taxation were discriminatory and in denial of the equal pro-
tection of the law. But the contention was not sustained. The 
Principles applied in those cases, in reaching that decision, are ap-
plicable here, and with the same result. 
Inequalities or exemptions in state taxation are not forbidden by 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That 
clause does not limit the power of the state to make any 
page 18 ~ reasonable classification of property, occupations, persons 
or corporations, for purposes of taxation. It merely for-
bids inequality caused by clearly arbitrary action, particularly such 
as is attributable to hostile discrimination against particular persons 
or classes. 
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Comm. of Va. 253 U. S. 412, 64 L. 
Ed. 989; Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477, 53 L. Ed. 290; Merchants 
and M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylimiia, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. Ed. 236; 
Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. Ed. 892; 
Va .. Electric and Po'wer Co. v. Conmionwealth, 169 Va. 688; 194 
S. E. 775; Farmers & Mechanics Ben's. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Roanoke 
and Bqtetoitrt Counties v. Horton, 157 Va., 114, 160 S. E. 315; 
Leona.rd v. Ma.·rwell, -, N. C. -, M 3 S. E. 2nd 316. Nor ·does 
this clause forbid exemption or classification based upon a principal 
of equalization of the tax load, whereby a class is exempted from 
an additional tax because it is taxed ~ another way. In Re Rich-
mond Linen Supply Co., 291 U. S. 641, 78 L. Ed. 1039; Va Blee-
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tric & Power Co. v. Conmionwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S. E. 775; 
Riclmwnd Linen Suppl)' Co. v. Lyncltbitrg, 160 Va. 644, 169 
S. E. 554. 
The exemptions grouped as class 4 in the summary of this tax 
classification, stated in the beginning of this discussion, need not 
be discussed. The defendant is not affected by these exemptions. 
They are, however, sustainable. Va. Electric & Po·wer Co. v. Com-
monwealth, supra; Carpel v. Richmond, 162 Va. 833; Leonard v. 
Maxwell, supra. 
In testing this statute the rule is to presume it to be constitu-
tional. The objections asserted against its constitutional-
page 19 ~ ity, when measured by this standard, do not appear to be 
sustainable. For the reasons which have been indicated, it 
has been concluded that section 192-b of the Tax Code of Virginia 
is a valid enactment. Since the defendant admits that it has violated 
that section, it is therefore guilty as charged in the warrant, and it 
shall be so adjudged. 
PHILIP WI~LIAMS, Judge. 
Filed in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court for city of 
Winchester, Va., January 27, 1940. 
CORINNE BARNETT, Deputy Clerk. 
page 20 ~ In the Corporation Court for the City of Winchester, 
Virginia, on Saturday the 27th day of January, 1940 and 
in the 164 year of the Commonwealth. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
v. 
CASKEY BAKING COMPANY, INC. 
This day came the Caskey Baking Company, Incorporated, 
charged upon a warrant by the Commonwealth of Virginia with a 
violation of section 192-b of its Tax Code. A Jury was waived and 
the court having fully heard and considered the facts stipulated by 
the parties and th~ arguments of their counsel submitted in written 
briefs, is of the opinion, for reasons stated in writing and made a 
part of this judgrnent by reference, that section 192-b of the Tax 
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Code does not violate Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 ( the commerce 
clause) nor the Fourteenth Amendment ( the equal protection of 
the law clause) of the Constitution of the United States, and that 
said section of the Tax Code is a valid enactment. 
It is adjudged and ordered that the Caskey Baking Company, 
Incorporated, is guilty of violating section 192-b of the Tax Code 
of Virginia, for that the said Company failed . to procure the 
license and pay the tax required and imposed thereby and that it 
peddled goods, wares and merchandise in the State of Virginia by 
selling and delivering the same at the same time to a retailer at 
other than a definite place of business operated by the seller, as 
charged in the warrant, and that the said Caskey Baking Company, 
Incorporated, shall pay a fine of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) and the 
costs of this prosecution. 
page 21 r The defendant objected and execpted to the entry ,of 
this judgment upon the ground that it is contrary to the 
la,v and the evidence, and made a motion that the execution be 
suspended pending the presentation of a petition for a writ of error 
to the judgment. Thereupon, it is ordered that the execution of 
this judgment be suspended for a period of sixty days from the 
date of its entry, so that during such period the defendant may 
petition for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, and thereafter such suspension shall continue until such 
petition is acted on by the Sup.reme Court of Appeals if such 
petition is actually filed within the specified time; provided, how-
ever, that the defendant or someone for it shall give or file a bond in 
the. Clerk's Office of this court, with surety to be approved by the 
Clerk thereof, in the penalty of three hundred dollars and con-
ditioned and executed according to the provisions of a section 6338 
of the Code of Virginia as amended. 
(Signed) .PHILIP WILLIAMS, Judge. 
Recorded in Law Order Book 13, page 162. 
page 22 r In the Corporation Court for the City of 
Winchester, Virginia. 
Caskey Baking Co. vs. Commonwealth 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
v. 
CASKEY BAKING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
A Corporation. 
29' 
To Abram P. Staples, Attorney General of Virginia, W. W. 
Martin, Assistant Attorney General, and James .P. Reardon, Com-
monwealth's Attorney for the City of Winchester, Virginia, counsel 
representing the Commonwealth of Virginia: 
This is to notify you that on the 19th day of March, 1940, at ten 
o'clock A. M., I will appear in the office of the Clerk of the Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Winchester, Virginia, and there apply 
to the Clerk of said Court for a transcript of the record in the 
above stylep cause, or so much thereof as is necessary and material 
to enable the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, or a Judge · 
thereof in vacation, to pass upon a petition for a writ of error to the 
action of the trial court in entering an order convicting the 
Caskey Baking Company,. Incorporated, a corporation, of selli~g 
and· offering for sale bakery products without having obtained a 
license as required by Section 192-b of the Tax Code of Virginia 
of 1938. 
R. GRAY WILLIAMS, 
Counsel for Caskey Baking Company, Incorporated. 
Received the within notice this 16th day of March, 1940. 
ABRAM P. STAPLES, 
W. W. MARTIN, 
JAMES P. REARDON, 
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
page 23 ~ State of Virginia, 
County of Frederick, to-wit: 
I, Clark M. Smith, Clerk of the Corporation Court of Winchester, 
in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
true transcript of so much of the record and proceedings in a certain 
suit between Commonwealth of Virginia vs. Caskey Baking Com-: 
0 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
pany, Incorporated, a corp. as the same exists among the records in 
my office, as I was directed to copy by Counsel for Caskey Baking 
Company, Inc., pursuant to Section 6339 of the Code of Virginia. 
- I further certify that notice required by Section 6339 of the Code 
of Virginia, of the intention of Caskey Baking Company, Incor-
porated, to apply for such transcript for the purpose of applying 
for a writ of error, was duly given to Counsel for Commonwealth 
of Virginia, a copy of which notice appears in the record hereby 
certified. 
Given under my hand and official seal this 20th day of March, 
1940. 
CLARK M. SMITH, 
Clerk Corporation Court, Winchester, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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